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of employees of privately owned companies to strike for legitimate labor
objectives, even where the consequences may be an interruption of a vital
utility service necessary to the public's health and welfare. However, this
does not preclude the state from limiting the right to strike of employees of
truly state-owned instrumentalities. NELSON G. Ross
Labor Law—Secondary Boycotts—Picketing Railroad Right-of-way.—
Carrier Corp. v. NLRB. 1—A complaint was filed by the National Labor
Relations Board against Local 5895, United Steel Workers Union, whose
members went on strike against Carrier Corporation on March 2, 1960. Picket
lines had been established and maintained at numerous entrances to the plant,
including an entrance to a railroad spur line on a right-of-way owned by the
New York Central Railroad adjacent to Carrier's property. The spur line was
used to provide rail service to Carrier and other companies. The railroad
tracks were enclosed by a fence, part of which was a railroad gate through
which the trains entered and left the spur. The Railroad's operations were not
disturbed until March 11 when, pursuant to arrangements made by Carrier,
the Railroad attempted to "spot" empty box cars at Carrier's siding and to
pick up loaded box cars. This operation required several passages through the
railroad gate. During this time union pickets at the railroad gate forcibly
sought to prevent the Railroad from servicing Carrier Corporation. The Trial
Examiner found the Union's actions to be in violation of Sections 8(b) (4) (i)
and 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 2 but the Board
reversed this finding.3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit HELD:
picketing of the Railroad's right-of-way where the manifest objective was to
prevent employees of the Railroad from handling goods of the struck employer
in the course of regular delivery and removal operations was a violation of the
NLRA. The Union was not furthering its legitimate objective of publicizing
its dispute in picketing the Railroad, nor were the actions of the Union in-
cidental to legitimate objectives of the dispute.
A review of the history of the interpretation of section 8(b) (4) shows
that the cases can be grouped into those involving disputes at the premises of
the primary employer and those taking place at the premises of a neutral
employer. In the situation of picketing the primary employer's premises many
activities coming within the literal terms of the statute have been found to be
1 311 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 83 S. Ct. 1298 (1963).
2 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(6) (4)
(1958), as amended by Pub. L. 86-257, § 704(b). Section 8(b) (4) provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for a union:
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person ... to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person . . . where in either case an object thereof is
• • •
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in products of any other person.... Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing... .
3 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 48 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1961).
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outside the proscriptions of section 8(b) (4). 4 In cases where the picketing oc-
curred at the premises of the neutral employer, referred to as a "common
situs,"5
 within certain limitations it could be found to be primary activity and
therefore lawful.°
In reversing the Board's decision, which was based on Local 761, Int'l
Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 7 the court stated that ownership of the
picketed premises was not critical. In effect, however, the court's decision
can only be interpreted as a finding that ownership is the crucial factor. This
appears to completely disregard the Supreme Court's express statement that
geography is not crucial in these situations.°
The purpose of section 8(b) (4), when enacted, and when amended, was
to preclude striking unions from using secondary boycotts which had the effect
of enlarging labor controversies to involve persons who had no concern in the
dispute.° The language of the statute has not been construed literally since to
do so would result in outlawing most strikes, primary in character, which
have been traditionally considered lawful. 1° Many problems have arisen in an
attempt to avoid a literal interpretation of the statute, perhaps the basic
problem being an attempt to distinguish beween lawful primary, and unlawful
secondary, strike activity. The Carrier case is but another facet of this basic
question.
The Supreme Court established the basic rationale in approaching section
8 (b) (4) cases in 1951 when it held that section 8 (b) (4) proscribes unlawful
objectives of union encouragement where union activity involves neutral
parties." Subsequent Board and court decisions undertook to determine
what were lawful and unlawful objectives. To refrain from interferring in any
manner with the neutral employer was not intended since a traditional ob-
jective of picketing was to inform employees and, incidentally, all others
dealing with the primary employer. While publicizing a dispute may in-
cidentally interfere with people dealing with the struck employer, such would
not be violative of section 804 (4). This was the ruling of the Second
Circuit in NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen & Helpers, Local
1422 where the court stated:
... a union may lawfully inflict harm on a neutral employer, without
violating § 8 (b) (4), so long as the harm is merely incidental to a
traditionally lawful primary strike, conducted at the place where
the primary employer does business. 13
4 Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960); Di Giorgio Fruit
Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers,
85 N.L.R.B. 417, 24 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1949).
5 The term "common situs" refers to the situation where two employers are doing
separate work on the same premises. A familiar example is in the construction industry
where general contractors and subcontractors are working on the same job site.
0 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950). See text
to note 14, infra.
7 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
8 Id. at 679.
9 International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950).
10 Supra note 7, at 672.
11 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
12 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951).
13 Id. at 67.
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Shortly before this, the Board had established certain limitations upon
picketing on the premises of a neutral employer to the effect that picketing
could occur only at times when the dispute took place on the neutral premises,
when the primary employer was engaged in usual business on the neutral
premises, when the picketing was reasonably close to the situs of dispute, and
when clear notice was displayed that the dispute was with the primary
employer."
As to the Union's objective, the court in the Carrier case found these
principles relevant. Applying them, it found that picketing the railroad right-
of-way was not furthering the objective of informing the Carrier employees of
the dispute. This was especially so since Carrier employees were not allowed
to use the right-of-way as an entrance to the plant, it being used exclusively
by the Railroad.
The Union and the NLRB argue that the Railroad should be treated as
any other shipper making pick-ups and deliveries to the plant, and, as the
dissent in the Carrier case stated, "picketing was designed to accomplish no
more than picketing outside one of Carrier's own delivery entrances might
have accomplished."" Under this thesis the Union's objective would come
within lawful primary activity. In the earliest "separate gate" case, United
Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers,1° the Board found no violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (4) when the Union picketed an entrance used exclusively by con-
struction workers of the secondary employer, which entrance was located
on the primary employer's property. The mere fact that picketing took place
at the primary premises was sufficient to find it primary activity. A more
explicit statement of the necessary conditions for finding unlawful picketing
in "separate gate" situations was made in United Steelworkers v. NLRB:"
There must be a separate gate marked and set apart from other gates;
the work done by the men who use the gate must be unrelated to the
normal operations of the employer and the work must be of a kind
that would not, if done when the plant were engaged in its regular
operations, necessitate curtailing those operations." (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
The Supreme Court approved of these criteria in Local 761.19
It is apparent that the Carrier court does not feel that a railroad right-of-
way is analogous to other delivery entrances that may exist on the primary
employer's premises. Its rationale appears to be that since the right-of-way is
owned by the Railroad and the primary employees have nothing to do with the
Railroad or its entrance any picketing there would be aimed directly at
secondary employees.
It would appear, however, that there is merit in the argument of the
Union that the railroad entrance should be treated as a "separate gate"
14 Supra note 6, at 549.
15 Supra note 1, at 154.
15 Supra note 4.
IT 289 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961).
18 Id. at 595.
19 Supra note 7.
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situation, ownership of the land being irrelevant. As stated in Retail Fruit
and Vegetable Clerks' Union2° there is
... no logical reason why the legality of such picketing should depend
on title to property. The impact on neutral employees of picketing
which deviates from the standards outlined . . . is the same whether
the common premises are owned by their own employer or by the
primary employer. 2 t
It is easy to view the railroad entrance as analogous to a separate gate since
it is but another way of reaching the primary employer's premises. More im-
portant, however, to allow the Railroad to be exempt from picketing because it
owned the land that leads to the primary premises would immunize just that
practice which the Supreme Court in Local 761 stated could not be immunized:
[I] f a separate gate were devised for the regular plant deliveries, the
barring of picketing at that location would make a clear invasion on
traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose
tasks aid the employer's everyday operations 22
The Supreme Court clearly indicates that it is not the ownership of the
picketed premises which is crucial; the "key" element is the type of work
performed by the secondary employees. 23 The Court refuses to apply a
mechanical test of ownership in preference to a more flexible test of determin-
ing whether the work done by the secondary employees is such as to be related
"to the normal operations of the employer," recognizing that the secondary
employer can be, and often is, lawfully enmeshed in the dispute with the
primary employer. If such is found to be the case, picketing of the secondary
premises is primary activity.
The court in the Carrier case not only does not follow this policy
enunciated in Local 761, but also appears to have misunderstood it. The Second
Circuit viewed Local 761 as a narrow ruling and only binding in fact situations
substantially similar to the one in that case. It felt that a determination of
the kind of work performed by the neutral employees should only be made use
of in assessing the legality of picketing which takes place at the primary
employer's premises. The Carrier court stated that " [i]n so limiting its hold-
ing the Court acknowledged the special solicitude of Congress and the Board
that the statute not unduly restrict traditional picketing at the premises of
the primary employer."24
It is readily apparent that the Carrier court emphasizes the geographical
factor, its interpretation of Local 761 being that a union could picket neutral
employees at the premises of the primary employer but not elsewhere. This
view in no way takes into consideration union objectives but rather reverts
to the mechanical, obsolete ownership test which was expressly repudiated by
the Supreme Court.	
EDWARD BOGRAD
20 116 N.L.R.B. 856,38 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1956).
21 Id. at 859, 38 L.R.R.M. 1324.
22 Supra note 7, at 681.
23 Id. at 680.
24 Supra note I, at 148.
203
